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Abstract 
In 2008 the highest number of attacks recorded against ships in the world was 
reported to have taken place off the coast of Africa. These attacks were carried out at 
greater distances from land, along the east coast of Africa, than ever before. In this 
article the extent of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the African context 
and underlying causes of piracy and armed robbery against ships off the coast of 
East Africa will be presented. The objective is to analyse incidents and the land and 
sea based causes in East Africa to account for the shift in strategy from attacking 
ships in territorial waters to attacking ships on the high seas.  A secondary aim is to 
determine, in view of the shifting background to the attacks, the responsibilities of 
navies and other role players in the process of countering such attacks. The article 
suggests that states need to review national legislation related to maritime security 
and that all state role players in the maritime domain need to cooperate more 
efficiently. 
Introduction 
Man has always carried his conflicts to the seas and threatened maritime security 
by disrupting good order at sea. Vulnerable unarmed merchant ships travelling at 
economic speed provide attractive targets in times of war for opposing sides intent 
on disrupting the flow of enemy commerce, and during times of peace for 
unscrupulous criminals bent on self enrichment. 
Sun Tzu, a Chinese general two thousand years ago, remarked that all warfare is 
based on deception (Giles, 2003:9). This is often true of man’s conflict at sea, 
whether in war or peace. During World War II Germany employed armed raiders 
disguised as merchant vessels to attack allied merchant shipping. Today high seas 
pirates use mother ships that are indistinguishable from bona fide fishing trawlers, 
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from which to launch attacks against unsuspecting merchant vessels on the high 
seas. 
A study by Dubner (in Meija and Mukherjee, 2004:324) on piracy and armed 
robbery against ships during the period 1989 – 1993 found that 61,8 percent of 
attacks occurred in the territorial waters of a country. The study also determined that 
the average distance of pirate attacks from shore is 11,55 nautical miles in the case 
of Indonesia, 68 nautical miles in Northeast Asia and 94,4 nautical miles in the 
South China Sea.   
In 2008 the number of recorded actual and attempted attacks against ships off the 
coast of Africa surpassed the total for South East Asia with the highest number of 
attacks being recorded in the Gulf of Aden and Somalia. In 2008 successful attacks 
along the east coast of Africa were also carried out at greater distances from land 
than ever before. The inability of the Somali government to respond has encouraged 
the pirates who attack ships with virtual impunity (ICC, Jan 2009a:26). The only 
opposing forces are navies of the European Union countries, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO) and other countries responding to the United Nations 
Resolutions 1816 (2008), 1838 (2008) and 1846 (2008) which call on states to take 
part in actively fighting piracy off Somalia by deploying naval vessels and aircraft. 
Pirates are, however, adapting to the naval presence by travelling further into the 
seas not guarded by warships of the United States and other countries (Rice in ICC, 
Jan 2009a:41). Should this trend continue ships in other vulnerable areas, previously 
unexploited by pirates, may become subject to attack as the pirates are forced to 
carry out their attacks further away from the heavily patrolled areas closer to the 
coast of Somalia.  
Since 2008, in the Gulf of Aden and off Somalia, in contrast to previous patterns 
attacks are shifting from territorial waters to the high seas. Somalia adopted a 
territorial sea of 200 nautical miles width in 1972 and ratified the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on 24 July 1972 but has not revoked 
the 1972 claim of a territorial sea of 200 miles (Treves, 2009:407). In the case of 
Somalia the shift to the high seas (beyond Somalia’s 200nm territorial sea) would 
seem to be of necessity due to the international naval forces patrolling the area. The 
need for a safe harbour close to the coast has apparently been overcome by the use 
of converted fishing trawlers, operating in tandem at long distances from the coast 
(ICC, 2009c:33). In the case of other states along the east coast attacks are escalating 
from theft from ships in port and at anchor to bold attacks on ships underway and 
specifically targeting high value cargoes in containers. The purpose of this article is 
to examine the impact the shift in tactics will have on the methods and strategies 
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employed by littoral states to counter attacks and how it will impact on the role 
players responsible for maritime security. 
The scope of the problem will be examined and offset against the underlying 
causes and shifting background of piracy to recommend appropriate responses to the 
high seas attacks.  
Extent of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the African context 
Between January 1998 and December 2004, the International Chamber of 
Commerce's (ICC) International Maritime Bureau recorded a total of 2 450 actual 
and attempted attacks against ships worldwide. The number of incidents reported for 
this period, which took place against ships off the African coast (494) constituted 
20% of the attacks worldwide. Most of these attacks were against ships berthed, at 
anchor or steaming in the territorial waters off the coast of Africa (ICC, Jan 2006:5). 
Attacks against ships along the coast of Africa spiked in 2005 with a total of 35 
actual and attempted attacks recorded against ships off Somalia. A concomitant rise 
in the number of attacks on ships in Nigeria led to Africa becoming the hot spot for 
piracy in 2008 by recording for the first time more attacks against ships (188) than 
South East Asia (55) and being responsible for 64% of the 293 incidents reported 
worldwide (ICC, Jan 2009a:5-6).  
Due to the availability of arms in the Horn of Africa region, home to the 
collapsed state of Somalia, attacks against ships in this region were particularly 
violent with pirates prepared to fire automatic weapons and rocket propelled 
grenades at ships in order to stop them (ICC, Jan 2009a:24). On 2 June 2008 the 
United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1816 (2008) which called on 
states to take part in actively fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia by deploying 
naval vessels and aircraft. The subsequent build up of naval units supported by ship 
borne helicopters forced attackers to adjust their tactics by attacking ships further off 
the coast and moving their attacks to the high seas. This in turn increased the size of 
the area needed to be patrolled. In 2008 ninety-two ships were attacked in the Gulf 
of Aden, 19 off the coast of Somalia and 40 off Nigeria (ICC Jan, 2009a:5-6). The 
remaining attacks off the east coast took place off Kenya (2), Tanzania (14) and 
Mozambique (20). The rest of the attacks recorded in African waters took place off 
the west coast, Angola (2), Cameroon (2), Congo (2), Equatorial Guinea (1), Ghana 
(7), Ivory Coast (3) and Morocco (1). All of the attacks on the west coast took place 
within the territorial waters of states except for one attack on an oil installation 75 
miles off the Nigerian coast (ICC, April 2009b). 
In the first three months of 2009 thirty-six actual and attempted attacks were 
recorded against ships steaming in the Gulf of Aden / Red Sea, 15 against ships off 
 70 
Somalia and 2 against ships off Nigeria. During the same period 5 actual attacks 
were recorded against ships steaming in the Gulf of Aden and 5 actual attacks 
against ships steaming off Somalia with pirates attacking vessels far off the east and 
south coast of Somalia to avoid the increased number of warships patrolling the Gulf 
of Aden.  Some attacks occurred up to approximately 600 nautical miles away from 
the Somali coast extending out to Kenya, Tanzania, the Seychelles and Madagascar 
and in one instance a bulk carrier reported an attempted attack 900 nautical miles 
from the coast. There has also been a cluster of attacks approximately 400 nautical 
miles southeast of Mogadishu. 
All types of vessels, general cargo, bulk carriers, tankers, ro-ro vessels, fishing 
vessels, sailing yachts and tugboats are being targeted by the pirates (ICC, April 
2009b). According to Kraska and Wilson (2008:41) the attacks so far from shore 
suggest that the pirates were using the shipping industry’s open-access automatic 
identification system (AIS) to intercept merchant ships. Merchant ships on 
international voyages are required to transmit AIS data.  Pirates at sea operating 
commercial equipment can also receive these signals and use the information to 
target ships. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) points out, however, that the 
SOLAS permits the Master of a vessel the discretion to switch off AIS if he believes 
that its use increases the ship's vulnerability. The decision is at the discretion of the 
Master but current naval advice is to turn the AIS off completely along the coast of 
Somalia (IMB, Jan 2009a:5).  
To carry out these attacks on the high seas, mother vessels capable of launching 
smaller boats to attack and hijack passing vessels are used. Once the attack is 
successfully carried out, the pirates sail the hijacked vessel towards the Somali coast 
and thereafter demand a ransom for the release of the vessel and crew.  The question 
arises as to whether the high seas attacks are merely expedient to move beyond the 
concentrated range of naval vessels patrolling the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden 
region or whether it is a long- term strategy which in time may be adopted by pirates 
operating from other African countries. What indeed, except for the lack of a 
friendly coastline nearby, as with the case of Somalia, would prevent vessels on the 
high seas off other African countries from being hijacked and held to ransom? 
With sophisticated technology and the use of trawlers operating together as 
support vessels and to keep the hijacked ship from being boarded in an attempt to 
rescue the hostages, pirates could hold vessels on the high seas for extended periods 
whilst negotiations for the release of crews and cargoes take place. With the gradual 
shift and gravitation from low level attacks against ships alongside or at anchor to 
attacks against vessels further out to sea and eventually to attacks using machine 
guns and rocket propelled grenade launchers on the high seas as has been the case 
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particularly in attacks off the East Coast of Africa, such a scenario may become a 
future strategy. Such a strategy would shift the responsibility for intercession at sea 
from law enforcement agencies in the territorial waters to navies on the high seas. 
Underlying causes for East African piracy 
According to Hari (2009:13) although some modern pirates are clearly just 
gangsters, others are trying to stop illegal dumping and trawling. Campbell (2008:2) 
points out that illegal fishing and environmental abuses in Somalia are responsible 
for a dramatic loss of revenue in the local fishing communities. The environmental 
degradation has in turn catalysed desperate acts of maritime piracy in Somali waters. 
During a phone interview with a pirate leader on a hijacked oil tanker off the coast 
of Somalia the pirate claimed that they had done this to stop illegal fishing and 
dumping in their waters and that they just wanted money (Gettleman, 2008:1). The 
willingness of ship owners to pay large ransoms for the return of their vessels and 
cargoes has also provided an added incentive to engage in maritime crime (Chalk, 
2009:3). 
The question has also arisen as to whether such attacks are for self-enrichment or 
to strengthen the coffers of terrorist groups. Mwangura (in Logan, 2008:3) believes 
that at least some of the ransom money is finding its way into the hands of Islamist 
insurgents in Somalia. According to Mwangura the pirates are doing this on behalf 
of organised crime and for terrorist activities. Perpetrators of attacks against ships 
need specialised equipment and knowledge to operate on the sea. The most likely 
candidates to lead such attacks would be unemployed fishermen who have both the 
contrivances and knowledge to undertake voyages in the territorial waters and 
beyond. The question as to whether external groups such as extremists and terrorists 
use the pirates to procure funding for their own agendas and operations would seem 
to be unlikely unless the extremist and terrorist groups had infiltrated the pirate 
group (Muller, 2009). The only possible incentive for sharing part of the proceeds of 
their crimes with extremists and terrorist groups would have to be based on a long- 
term strategy of expelling foreign plunderers which would seem unlikely. 
According to Daly (2008:3) there are indications that poverty and unrealised 
nationalistic ambitions in Somalia are causing a number of soldiers to turn to crime 
and join the Somali pirates. The availability of small arms in Africa, such as pistols, 
light / heavy calibre machine guns and automatic assault rifles and rocket-propelled 
grenades provide pirates with an enhanced means to operate on a more destructive 
and sophisticated level (Chalk, 2009:3). Coupled to unemployment and poverty this 
ready supply of arms makes piracy an easy alternative to earn a living through 
crime. The absence of a functioning navy, police force and civil authority to enforce 
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laws has left Somalia helpless to prevent theft from taking place on the high seas in 
the vicinity of the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden. 
According to Lyman and Potter (2007:312-313) the core of syndicate activity in 
Africa revolves around black market business crimes committed by highly educated 
but frequently unemployed or underemployed young people. The east coast of 
Africa, further south from Somalia, with heavy volumes of traffic into ports like 
Mombassa and Dar-es-Salaam make these ports and anchorages attractive targets for 
opportunistic crimes. Attacks, however, are also becoming more sophisticated and in 
some instances ships are being specifically targeted for their cargoes. Perpetrators in 
these cases often attack while posing as agents for sellers who have prearranged for 
the sale of the stolen goods on the black market (Lyman and Potter, 2007:129). The 
underlying cause giving rise to such attacks lies not only in the poverty and 
unemployment on land in these regions but in lax coastal and port side security, 
enabling low-level attacks, especially harbour thefts and against ships at anchor to 
be carried out (Chalk, 2009:3). These attacks are also escalating and taking place 
further out to sea due to the inability of states on the eastern seaboard of Africa to 
effectively patrol their waters, either individually or jointly in co-operation with 
other states. 
Further south South Africa has been spared from successful attacks against ships in 
South African waters. The factors which are likely to have contributed are a navy 
with capabilities to carry out patrols throughout the Exclusive Economic Zone, an 
inhospitable coastline with no ports for perpetrators to operate from, a strong 
economy with a functioning criminal justice system and the absence of the 
underlying causes as in the case of Somalia. South Africa has also criminalised 
piracy (SA, 2002) and the hijacking of ships in its waters (SA, 2004) in national law.  
Role players and shifting responsibilities in maritime policing 
For the purpose of this article maritime policing will be regarded as all the lawful 
actions undertaken by a state to create national laws, to administer such laws and 
conventions and the application of such laws to ensure formal social control in the 
area of a state’s offshore jurisdiction. 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to which 
most African littoral states are a signatory, declares piracy in article 101 to be a 
criminal act which is committed on the high seas or in a place outside the 
jurisdiction of any state. Perpetrators of attacks on ships in ports, harbours and the 
territorial waters of a state cannot be charged with piracy, unless the state in whose 
territorial waters the attack has occurred has specifically criminalised piracy within 
its territorial waters in its national legislation. Canada and New Zealand are two 
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countries that have adopted measures in their criminal code that criminalise piracy in 
terms of the law of nations within their area of jurisdiction (which includes their 
harbours, territorial waters, contiguous zone and extended economic zone (Fouché, 
2006:39). 
Perpetrators of armed attacks on ships in a state's territorial waters can be 
charged with common law offences such as robbery, murder, assault and damage to 
property. Perpetrators can also be charged under a state’s statutory laws. The 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (SUA Convention) obliges contracting states to create statutory 
provisions in their national laws to criminalise the hijacking of a ship. 
South Africa (SA, 2004), Kenya (Kenya, 2009) and Tanzania (Tanzania, 2003) 
have criminalised the hijacking of ships in their national laws. Kenya and Tanzania 
have also made provision for the prosecution of persons who hijack a ship whether 
the ship is in Kenyan waters or elsewhere and whether the perpetrators are citizens 
of Kenya or Tanzania, or not, which would effectively mean that pirates who hijack 
ships on the high seas off Kenya and Tanzania can be prosecuted in those countries. 
This is an important legal provision given the controversy surrounding the 
procedures with regards to suspected pirates arrested off the east coast of Africa.  
Hawkins (2009:1) points out that piracy is a universal crime and that each 
country may arrest pirates at sea and prosecute them at home, but that in practice, 
whether a country can prosecute arrested pirates depends on its own laws. He 
provides the example of the Danish Navy that detained and later released ten 
suspected armed pirates in September 2008 because Danish national law only 
provides for the prosecution of pirates in Denmark if they are accused of attacking a 
Danish ship or Danish citizens. Hawkins (2009:2) further points out that some 
navies are reluctant to detain the pirates they apprehend for fear of becoming legally 
responsible for them. As a result many suspected pirates apprehended by navies off 
Somalia are released without being prosecuted.  
Law enforcement in the territorial waters of a state (including harbours as ports 
of entry) is generally entrusted to the police force of the state. In the case of South 
Africa, section 13(6) of Chapter 5 of the South African Police Service Act, 
empowers any member of the South African Police Service  
- where it is reasonably necessary for the purposes of control over the illegal 
movement of people or goods across the borders of the Republic,  
- without a warrant to search any person, premises, other place, vehicle, vessel or 
aircraft, or any receptacle of any nature,  
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- at any place in the Republic within 10 km or any reasonable distance from any 
border between the Republic, or inside the Republic within 10 km or any reasonable 
distance from such territorial waters and  
- seize anything found in the possession of such a person or upon or at or in such 
premises, other place, vehicle, vessel, aircraft or receptacle and which may lawfully 
be seized (SA, 1995:58). 
Police forces or services are not the sole agencies entrusted with countering 
criminality and piracy at sea.  Navies play a role as well and it is generally accepted 
that all navies fulfil three major functions for their country being diplomatic, 
policing and military (Bennett and Söderland, 2008:7). The same authors point out 
that the South African Constitution provides for a navy with a mandate to amongst 
others co-operate with other state departments in upholding and enforcing both 
international and South African law at sea. 
The situation off the coast of Somalia in 2008 and the first quarter of 2009 where 
warships of several nations are conducting anti-piracy patrols has proven that 
concentrated naval intervention is effective in preventing attacks on ships, but is 
unable to stop the attacks. Pirates are adopting a strategy to attack ships further from 
the coast, to avoid the naval patrols, which is also curtailing the effectiveness of the 
patrols due to the vast area covered by seas off the coast of Africa. 
The shift in strategy by pirates from attacking ships in territorial waters to ships 
on the high seas moves the responsibility for interdicting in such attacks from the 
police forces of states to that of navies. The United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS) in articles 105 and 107 empowers the warships or ships on 
government service of every state to seize a pirate ship on the high seas and arrest 
the persons and seize the property on board. Article 110 of UNCLOS justifies the 
boarding of a foreign ship on the high seas to verify the ships right to fly its flag if 
there is reasonable ground for suspecting that the ship is engaged in piracy. The 
courts of the state that carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be 
imposed and the actions to be taken with regard to the ships, subject to the rights of 
third parties in good faith. Guyo (2009:1) points out, however, that in this regard the 
arrest and prosecution of pirates fall within the precinct of a state’s national law. 
Successful prosecution would thus depend on whether the corresponding national 
legal standard exists and the degree to which the enforcing state has adopted the 
universal jurisdiction over piracy as an international crime that can be subject to 
arrest and prosecution anywhere in the world  
Vreÿ (2008:14) avers that navies should be used to combat piracy on the high 
seas. The situation in the Horn of Africa has proved, however, that once assailants 
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have boarded a vessel, actions by navies become handicapped because of the 
complexity of interests involved such as the nationality of the vessel, nationality of 
the crew, ownership of the cargo and the identity of the flag state. Given the 
aforementioned complexity and to prevent loss of life, the International Maritime 
Organisations draft Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy 
and Armed Robbery Against Ships (IMO, 2000:2) recommends that in any cases 
where persons on board have been abducted or held to ransom, the primary objective 
of any law enforcement operation must be their safe release and that their rescue 
must take precedence over all other considerations. 
On 26 January 2009 the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) convened a 
meeting in Djibouti of 17 states from the Western Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden and 
Red Sea areas to discuss cooperation in a manner consistent with international law, 
in interdicting and seizing suspect ships and the property on board such ships and 
rescuing ships, persons and property subjected to acts of piracy. The meeting 
adopted a code of conduct, effective from 29 January 2009, which was signed by 
nine countries in the region, being Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Maldives, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania and Yemen. The code of conduct is open 
for consideration for signature by the remaining 12 countries in the region, including 
South Africa.  Signatories of the code of conduct undertake to review their national 
legislation with a view towards ensuring that there are laws in place to criminalise 
piracy and armed robbery against ships and adequate guidelines for the exercise of 
jurisdiction, conduct of investigation and prosecution of alleged offenders. The 
meeting was also attended by international bodies such as Interpol (IMO News, 
2009:7). 
Other international interventions to combat African piracy include a conference 
on 23 April 2009 held in Brussels and chaired by the United Nations Secretary 
General and the African Union Chairperson. The purpose of the conference, 
attended by politicians and donors was to mobilise the international community with 
the purpose of securing peace in Somalia. The European Union's Executive (the 
European Commission) pledged funds for, amongst other issues, rebuilding 
Somalia's law enforcement and criminal justice system (DPA, 2009:1). The 
importance of law enforcement in the fight against piracy was recognised by the 
Secretary General of Interpol who on 29 May 2009 pointed out during a G8 meeting 
in Rome that maritime piracy should be considered an international organised crime 
problem requiring a law enforcement investigative approach rather than a solely 
military response. In this respect he proposed the creation of an investigative 
prosecutorial taskforce based in the affected region (Interpol media release, 
52/2009). 
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The international dimension to the problem of combating piracy and armed 
robbery at sea, the need for cooperation between states and coordination of action 
was again emphasised during an anti-piracy conference on 19 May 2009 attended by 
governments, navies and shipping bodies held in Kuala Lumpur to discuss an initial 
resolution from more than 60 countries and the European Union. In the amended 
resolution which was adopted by the conference the United Nations is invited to 
consider further the possibility of taking joint measures through the European Union 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and its working groups to 
coordinate maritime force operations to suppress acts of piracy and armed robbery 
against ships along the coast of Somalia (France 24, 2009:1).  
In 2005 Minister Ronnie Kasrils (the former South African Intelligence Minister) 
pointed out that even if all the African countries worked together to develop their 
maritime and naval power, their capacity would still be small when compared to the 
length of Africa's coasts and the size of African exclusive economic zones (Fouché, 
2006:141). The answer however, does not only reside in optimising military ways 
and means.  The Secretary General of the IMO on 26 January 2009 in Djibouti 
stated that it is in the best interests of the international community to continue 
developing multilateral cooperation agreements to put in place the strong 
infrastructure (legislative and practical) needed, and through alliances of 
governments to move to reduce the risk of attacks on merchant ships.  Such 
cooperation include coordinated patrols in high risk areas, information sharing and 
intelligence exchange, and once an act of piracy or armed robbery has taken place 
against ships, to arrest, prosecute and detain the perpetrators (IMO, 2009:3). 
Guyo (2009:2) agrees that the successful prosecution of the Somali pirates in 
Kenya on the basis of the bilateral arrangements provide both opportunities and 
challenges. He points out that such an arrangement provides a quick step to 
supplement the shortcoming of international law and demonstrates international 
partnership in fighting piracy as an international crime. It expedites the prosecution 
of the suspected pirates but Guyo warns, however, that the practice of bilateral 
arrangements to prosecute the crime of piracy goes against the International Law of 
the sea (Guyo, 2009:2). It also carries the risk of countries like Kenya becoming a 
target of reprisals from the crime syndicates. 
South Africa is involved in African Union activities and through the South 
African Navy is committed to come to the assistance of states unable to police their 
own waters effectively against piracy. South Africa also has a number of bilateral 
navy-to-navy memoranda of understanding with various other nations and 
international groupings. In some cases these are the basis for international exercises 
with other navies (Bennett and Söderland, 2008:9). The South African Navy also 
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maintains a naval coordination and guidance for shipping centre (NCAGS). The 
NCAGS has a strategic function that aims to protect merchant shipping, including 
that of South Africa's trading partners from regional tensions, piracy or other forms 
of aggression (Von Ziel, 2005:1).  
Vreÿ (2008:14) suggests that in instances where states have a limited capability 
to protect their interests at sea they may consider procuring the services of private 
security companies to augment their shortcoming. He also proposes that private 
security guards could be placed on board vessels navigating danger areas. This 
deterrent to would-be pirates could also be strengthened by the presence of 
patrolling warships in the area (Vrey, 2008:14). In a different vein, the Djibouti 
Code (adopted on 29 January 2009) by participating states makes provision in article 
seven for participants to nominate law enforcement officials to embark upon ships 
on patrol of another participant with the purpose of assisting the host participant and 
conducting operations from the host participant ship. The so-called “shipriders” in 
the shiprider agreements are called for in United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1851. Such embarked law enforcement officials would greatly enhance 
the investigation and assist the state prosecuting the arrested pirates with good 
evidence for court purposes. Thus the combination of private security on 
commercial vessels and embarked law enforcement officials on patrolling naval 
vessels may provide an effective deterrent to would be offenders  
Cooperation among states in terms of joint patrolling, the sharing of intelligence 
and the investigation and prosecution of alleged offenders remains the most 
important means to combat piracy. States need to look at ways of enhancing 
cooperation between their own navies, police forces and state departments tasked 
with maritime security. States also need to have a maritime capability able to protect 
their sovereignty in the maritime domain as well as a functioning criminal justice 
system if piracy is to be kept in check or eradicated.  
Conclusion 
In the light of the 2009 Djibouti conference the national legislation of states 
needs to be re-examined with the view to possibly collate all national maritime 
security related legislation in one act. A common act can promote regional 
harmonisation of laws for a uniform approach to the arrest, investigation and 
prosecution of offenders. Naval personnel must have knowledge of the provisions of 
the international conventions and the relevant national legislation of the state 
empowering them to act on the high seas and within their exclusive economic zones 
against piracy and other acts of maritime violence. Navies need to cooperate with 
fellow departmental role players of their state in the maritime domain - the police 
and judiciary in particular. States also need to cooperate with other states in their 
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region in terms of joint maritime patrols, the sharing of information on piracy and 
the joint investigation of piracy and armed robbery of ships. 
In light of the constant shifting background to acts of piracy and armed robbery 
against ships and the ever-increasing sophistication apparent in the methods of 
attack is it likely that pirates may shift their field of operations all the more away 
from the lucrative targets in the territorial seas close to their land bases to the high 
seas.  In a sense such a shift could well be a case of necessity being the mother of 
invention. The most likely long-term solution to the problem of piracy off Somalia is 
the creation of a stable state in Somalia with a functioning criminal justice system 
and the means to apprehend perpetrators. Until such a time, a viable alternative to 
the preventative patrols in the area by the navies of many nations of the world seems 
to lack.  At the moment, the naval response apparently forces the pirates to seek 
unprotected targets further and further out to sea. Only time will tell whether more 
effective counter-piracy operations will have the long-term effect on pirates to 
change their locus of operations, away from the coastal areas to the high seas. Such a 
move would necessitate a concomitant change in tactics by states.  
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